I think what's happening right now in Syria is gruesome but a very fascinating to analyze from a diplomacy perspective. It reminds me of a class I took in college on crisis simulation in East Asia, where our class broke into groups and simulated conflicts such as the Chinese Civil War, the Korean War, the Taiwan Strait crises, etc.
If you look at the interests of the different parties, I think there is definitely a diplomatic deal that can be had to avert "war in Syria" (i.e. a Western intervention in the already ongoing Syrian Civil War).
The factions:
Bashar al-Assad (the "Loyalists") -- An ally of Russia, Assad has basically consolidated control in the western half of Syria including most of Syria's major population centers. The Loyalist's goals are simple: regain control of as much of Syria as possible. To this end, Loyalists crave as many weapons as possible, which includes both chemical and Russian-built conventional weapons. These weapons are enough to gain a decisive firepower advantage over the rebels, and while enough casualties could demoralize the West into withdrawing from Syria, they are ultimately not adequate to directly defeat a Western intervention. Given enough time, and no Western intervention, two outcomes are likely: the Loyalists either win the civil war outright after much bloodshed, or the Loyalists fail to rout the rebels, with Syria de facto splitting into two or three separate states.
The Syrian opposition (the "Rebels") -- They come in all varieties, from Western-oriented secular, liberal democrats to Al-Qaeda style fanatical Jihadists. The only thing that unites the rebels is opposition to Assad. However, this thin connection is not nearly enough to stop the rebel factions from competing with one another for control, or even attacking one another. With no support from the West, the secularists will probably continue to lose ground to radical Jihadist factions (who have been getting some international support from different corners of the Arab world).
The Kurds -- Often overlooked, the Kurdish ethnic minority controls the far east of Syria. Enjoying relative peace, the Kurds simply want to be left alone, and to possibly form a greater Kurdistan with their Kurdish neighbors in the extreme regions of Iraq and Turkey.
The U.S. & its NATO allies ("the West") -- The West has an interest in human rights, democracy, freedom, free trade, etc. As such, the West frequently disparages Assad as a "tyrant" and has little interest in seeing Assad win the Civil War. But for the same reasons, the West also has reservations about those elements of the Syrian opposition which essentially fit the mold of "terrorists," which has stalled the plans of arming the rebels. Recently, the West was essentially victorious in the Libyan Civil War, achieving the overthrow of a brutal dictator through the limited measures of imposing a no-fly zone and arming the rebels. However, the West has been discouraged by the mixed record of costly regime change in Iraq and Afghanistan, which makes the West less enthusiastic in Syrian intervention, and has caused the consensus to favor a "limited strike" focused only on retaliation and enforcement of the international taboo against chemical weapons, rather than full regime change. The reluctance of the West is shown through the British Parliament's veto of the use of force in Syria, and the U.S. Congress's likely veto if the question was put to a vote now. At the end of the day, the West is interested primarily in ensuring weapons of mass destruction do not fall into the hands of a "rogue regime" or terrorists. This is why Obama drew a "red line" at the use of chemical weapons, the crossing of which which has kick-started the plans of intervention again following their use by the Assad regime on August 21st.
Vladimir Putin ("Russia") -- First and foremost, Russia has significant economic and military ties with the Assad regime, interests which would be jeopardized if the Syrian opposition wins. But Russia's interests in supporting Assad run deeper than this. More broadly, Russia has an interest in demonstrating its credibility -- that it still has the clout to support its allies against U.S. aggression. However, realistically Russia lacks the power to directly fight off a Western intervention, and Russia knows this. Russia also has an interest in opposing the radical Islamic "terrorists" in Syria as shown through its problems in the rebellious region of Chechnya (ironically, this is also where the Boston bombers came from. Easy to see why this is the interest most shared with the West). Putin also likes to see democratic movements around the world fail whenever possible so as to deter any similar upheavals at home in Russia.
The Chinese Communist Party ("China") -- Unlike Russia, China does not have much military or economic ties to Syria. But similar to Russia, China's likely UN Security Council veto is based upon the same "anti-democratic" principle. Even this interest standing by itself is apparently great enough to risk jeopardizing relations with the West.
Despite the major differences among the factions, there is space for a diplomatic deal. If Assad agrees to give up his chemical weapons peacefully in exchange for no Western intervention, then most of the parties achieve their primary goals. The West gets to protect itself from chemical weapons without having to do a costly intervention. Russia gets to show that it is still a reliable ally and a key diplomatic player on the world stage. Assad has to give up one of his key advantages over the rebels, but he gets to keep the West out of Syria and the military support of Russia against the rebels. The rebels kind of get screwed, but that is to be expected since they lack a place at the negotiating table. Provided all sides are willing to negotiate and the details of chemical disarmament are worked out satisfactorily, this kind of deal should be able to be reached. Assad may even choose to abide by the terms of such an agreement, since after all, turning away the UN inspectors is ultimately what got Saddam Hussein taken out.